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NATURE OF THE CASE
The above-named DefendantIRespondent, MIKE McPHEE (hereinafter:
McPhee) hereby disagrees and objects to the Statement of the Case presented by the
above-named PlaintiffIAppellant, CURTIS JAY JOHNSON (hereinafter: "Johnson") and
therefore submits the following Statement of the Case.
The District Court entered an Order granting McPhee's Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissed Johnson's claims against McPhee of Intentional lnfliction of
Emotional Distress, Negligent lnfliction of Emotional Distress and Breach of Contract.
Johnson appeals the ~istrictCourt's Order Granting McPhee's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
McPhee hereby disagrees and objects to the Course of the Proceedings
presented by Johnson and therefore submits the following Course of the Proceedings.
On December 7, 2005, Johnson filed a Complaint in the above-entitled matter
asserting claims against McPhee of Negligent lnfliction of Emotional Distress,
Intentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress and Breach of Contract (hereinafter:
"Complaint") (R. p. I).
On July 24, 2006, Johnson filed his First Amended Complaint and therein
asserted the following new factual allegations against McPhee: McPhee was an agent
of JCAV, LLC; Johnson represented McPhee and JCAV, LLC as a licensed real estate

agent and performed conceptual and organizational work toward a development known
as Radiant Lake Estates; on or about May 1, 2003, McPhee entered into a verbal
contract with Johnson for a commission for the purchase of certain real estate; the real
estate was purchased by JCAV, LLC in the year 2005; Johnson performed under the
contact; Johnson did not have a written commission agreement; on or about May 1,
2005, McPhee breached the agreement by his refusal to execute a commission
agreement; McPhee used undue influence to cause Johnson to forgo his right to
compensation; and McPhee partly performed by paying Johnson two - $2,000.00 (Two
Thousand and 001100 Dollar) checks (R. p. 93).
On August 11, 2006, McPhee filed his Answer to the First Amended Complaint

(R. p. 116). Among others, McPhee alleged affirmative defenses of Statute of Frauds,
Illegality and Statute of Limitations, Idaho Code § 5-219 (R. p. 118).
McPhee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in Support
thereof. Said Motion and Memorandum have not been made part of the Record on
Appeal. It is Johnson's obligation to ensure a proper Record on Appeal. The
Transcript on Appeal evidences McPhee's filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and legal basis
therefore (Tr. pp. 15-26).
On December 6, 2006, McPhee's Co-Defendant in the above-entitled matter,
JCAV, LLC (hereinafter: "JCAV), filed true and correct copies of Johnson's deposition

transcripts with the Court (R. p. 135). Two of Johnson's deposition transcripts that were
filed by JCAV were depositions taken by McPhee (R. pp. 151-169; R. pp. 190-200). In
I

rendering the decision herein, the District Court acknowledged that Johnson's
deposition testimony was part of the record and stated ". . .the defendants [McPhee and
JCAV] had incorporated into their briefs a large measure of the testimony, depositional
testimony, from Mr. Johnson from two separate depositions and that that information
has constituted primarily the facts upon which the record has been established in this
I

case. . ."
On December 18, 2006, Johnson filed an Affidavit (R. p. 263). This Affidavit was

I

I

presumably in response to McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment
On December 26,2006, Johnson filed an Answer to McPhee's Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. p. 307).

1

On January 5, 2007, McPhee filed an Objection to Johnson's December 18,
2006 Affidavit citing lack of foundation and hearsay to a number of the exhibits attached
to said Affidavit (R. p. 386).
On January 9, 2007, Johnson filed another Affidavit, and attachments thereto,
presumably in response to McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. p. 389).
On January 10, 2007, McPhee filed an Objection to Johnson's January Affidavit
and the attachments thereto (R. p. 399).

On January 11,2007, McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by
the District Court.
On January 25, 2007, the District Court entered an Order granting McPhee's
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Johnson's claims of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Breach of Contract
(R. p. 405).
On February 22, 2007, Johnson filed the Notice of Appeal herein (R. p. 409).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

McPhee hereby disagrees and objects to the Statement of Facts presented by
Johnson and therefore provides the following Statement of the Facts. In addition, it
should be noted that Johnson has entirely failed to support any of the factual
allegations in his Brief with any citation to the Record.
In June of 2001, Johnson was employed as a realtor by Century 21 in Coeur
dlAlene, Idaho (R. p. 158; Tr. p. 31, Ln. 9-15).
In June of 2001, Johnson became acquainted with McPhee when Johnson
answered a telephone call, which McPhee made to Century 21 inquiring about the
purchase of certain real property in Kootenai County known as the Highlands (R. p.
158; Tr. p. 31, Ln. 9-15; R. p. 158; Tr. p. 32, Ln. 3-9).

Johnson and McPhee thereafter communicated over the telephone for
approximately five (5) to six (6) months regarding the Highlands property (R. p. 158; Tr.
p. 31, Ln. 18-25).
In Johnson's first deposition he alleged that McPhee began "generally abusing"
him sometime between February 2003 and May 2003 (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 23, Ln. 12-15).
Johnson testified in his first deposition that said "general abuse" consisted of
McPhee telling Johnson that he was a "piece of shit real estate agent" (R. p. 158; Tr. p.
32, Ln. 16-21), that McPhee told Johnson over the telephone that he was going to have
intercourse with Johnson's girlfriend (R. p. 159, Tr. p. 34, Ln. 22-23), and that McPhee
had a temper tantrum and used profanity (R. p. 160; Tr. p. 38, Ln. 2-3).
Johnson testified in his first deposition that McPhee's alleged "general abuse"
ended sometime between July 4,2003 and July 31, 2003 (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 23, Ln. 1618).
In Johnson's first deposition, Johnson also testified that McPhee inflicted
"obscene abuse" upon him and that said "obscene abuse" began sometime in May
2003 (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 23, Ln. 21-25).
In Johnson's first deposition he testified that the McPhee's alleged "obscene
abuse" consisted of McPhee telling Johnson to perform oral sex (R. p 162; Tr p. 42,
Ln. 15-16) and McPhee telling Johnson to "bend over and let McPhee drive" (R. p. 145;
Tr. p. 31, Ln. 14-23).

In Johnson's first deposition, he testified that McPhee's alleged "obscene abuse"
ended in July 2003 (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 23, Ln. 21-25; R. p. 145; Tr. p. 31, Ln. 7-25; Tr. p.
32, Ln. 1-8).
In his amended Complaint, Johnson alleged that McPhee "generally abused" him
in the year 2005 (R. p. 93).
In his second deposition Johnson testified that, in addition to the "general abuse"
described in the first deposition, McPhee allegedly abused him on the telephone in the
year 2005 (R. p. 194; Tr. p. 91, Ln. 25; Tr. p. 92, Ln 1-21). Johnson was unable to
provide dates upon which the alleged telephone conversations occurred. Johnson
testified that in the year 2005, he spoke with McPhee on the telephone five times. Two
of the telephone calls were initiated by Johnson and three of the calls by McPhee.
Johnson testified that in one of the telephone conversations, McPhee said: "You
deranged motherfucker; no one will believe you; you're crazy; you're a fly on my ass; we
don't have to pay you" (R. p. 195; Tr. p. 92, Ln. 3-21).
Johnson also alleged that McPhee "generally abused" him in the year 2005, via
text messaging (R. p. 195; Tr. p. 94, Ln 1-19). Johnson alleges the following sequence
of text messaging occurred between he and McPhee on October 5, 2005 (Affidavit of
Jay Curtis Johnson (R. p. 129):

a.

10/5/05 - 12:35 p.m. -Johnson to McPhee: "A Liar cannot have true
emotions. Justified degeneracy. I am the scapegoat. Iforgive and live."
(Emphasis added.)

b.

10/5/05 - 7:33 p.m. - McPhee to Johnson: "Glad you are starting to
understand yourself you should forgive yourself and start living life."

c.

10/5/05 - 8:07 p.m. - Johnson to McPhee: "And you should honor your
word and your intent and acknowledge my instrumental role in creating
the lots you brag about. You do not have to pay me. What an ass."

d.

10/5/05 - 8:43 p.m. - McPhee to Johnson: "Fuck you get a lifd [sic]."

e.

1015105 - 8:46 p.m. -Johnson to McPhee: "I am life."

Johnson testified in his first deposition that he did not terminate his relationship
with McPhee after allegedly being subjected to "general abuse" and "obscene abuse"
because Johnson had a philosophical position of acceptance; that it was better for
people not to repress themselves; and Johnson allowed McPhee to express himself (R.
p. 161; Tr. p. 44, Ln. 4-13).
Johnson prepared a "time line" containing the dates of the alleged "obscene
abuse" and "general abuse" (R. p. 169)

ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the District Court Err in Granting McPhee's Motion for Summary
Judgment?

2.

Is McPhee entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs?
ARGUMENT

The District Court Did not Err in Granting McPhee's Motion for Summary
Judgment
A.

Standard on Appeal

In Marchand v. JEM Sportwear, Inc, 2006 Idaho 32476, -P.3d-

(2006)

this Court reiterated the standard to be applied to a Motion for Summary Judgment:
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." This Court construes the record in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party. If reasonable minds might come to
different conclusions, summary judgment is inappropriate.
B.

Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
1.

Johnson's Claims of Negligent and Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress are barred by the Statute of Limitations
and Johnson's Allegations do not Support an Extension of the
Statute of Limitations under the Continuing Tort Theory or
Equitable Estoppel

ldaho Code 3 5-219(4) provides a two year statute of limitation for an action
alleging an injury to a person. This limitation applies to claims of Negligent and
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Curtis v. Firth, 123 ldaho 598,850 P.2d 749 (1993), the ldaho Supreme
Court stated:
As we have indicated previously, the definition of intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires that there must be a causal connection
between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and the
emotional distress must be severe. Evans, 118 ldaho at 220, 796 P.2d at
97. By its very nature this tort will often involve a series of acts over a
period of time, rather than one single act causing severe emotional
distress. For that reason we recognize the concept of continuing tort, as it
was originally applied in Farber, should be extended to apply in other
limited contexts, including particularly intentional infliction of emotional
distress. We note, however, that embracing this concept in the area of
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress does not throw open
the doors to permit filing these actions at any time. The courts which have
adopted this continuing tort theory have generally stated that the statute of
limitations is only held in abeyance until the tortious acts cease. See, e.g.,
Page, 729 F.2d at 818 and Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S. W.2d 819 (Tex.
App.1990). At that point the statute begins to run. If at some point after
the statute has run the tortious acts begin again, a new cause of action
may arise, but only as to those damages which have accrued since the
new tortious conduct began.
Johnson filed his initial Complaint herein on December 7, 2005. Pursuant to
ldaho Code, Johnson's claims for the torts of Negligent and Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress must have arisen no later than December 7, 2003, in order for his
Complaint to have been filed in a timely manner

Johnson's claims for Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress for
acts allegedly occurring in the years 2002 and 2003 are barred by the Statute of
Limitations as set forth below.
In Johnson's first deposition he alleged that McPhee began "generally abusing"
him sometime between February 2003 and May 2003 and that the "general abuse"
ended sometime between July 4,2003 and July 31, 2003 (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 22, Ln. 2125; Tr. p. 23, Ln. 1-20).
In his Amended Complaint Johnson alleged that McPhee also "generally abused"
him in the year 2005 (R. p. 116). In his second deposition, Johnson alleged that
McPhee abused him on the telephone in the year 2005 (R. p. 194; Tr. p. 91, Ln. 25; Tr.
p. 92, Ln 1-21). Johnson was unable to provide the dates of the alleged telephone
conversations.
Johnson also alleged that McPhee "generally abused" him in October, 2005, via
text messaging (R. p. 195; Tr. p. 94, Ln 1-19).
In Johnson's first deposition, Johnson alleged that McPhee began "obscenely
abusing" him sometime in May 2003 (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 23, Ln. 21-25), and that said
"obscene abuse" ended in July 2003 (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 23, Ln. 21-25; R. p. 145; Tr. p.
31, Ln. 7-25; R. p. 145; Tr. p. 32, Ln. 1-8).
Johnson's subsequent pleadings and deposition failed to assert any additional
allegations regarding "obscene abuse".

a.

No Continuing Tort

As set forth above, Johnson initially alleged in his Complaint, and testified at his
first deposition, that all of McPhee's alleged tortious conduct ceased in July of 2003.
After McPhee filed his first Motion for Summary Judgment asserting the statute of
limitations defense, Johnson amended his Complaint and alleged that McPhee abused
him in the year 2005. However, Johnson has been unable to articulate a specific time
of the alleged abuse, except for the text messages set forth above. Clearly, the text
messages set forth above do not constitute tortious conduct amounting to negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The fact that Johnson miraculously recalled additional alleged tortious conduct
after being made aware that his initial claims were barred by the statute of limitation
should be viewed with great scepticism by the Court.
McPhee does not concede that he abused McPhee in any way, shape or form at
any time. However, for the purpose of analyzing the "continuing tort theory," and with
an understanding of the standard applied by the Court on a Motion for Summary
Judgment, it will be assumed for the purposes of this analysis that Johnson's
allegations are true.
Johnson testified in his first deposition that McPhee "generally" and "obscenely"
abused him from February 2003 to July 2003. This is a period of six (6) months.
Johnson testified in his second deposition that McPhee allegedly abused him in

the year 2005 in conversations they had on unknown dates, and via text messaging in
October of 2005. Therefore, assuming that the alleged abuse suffered by Johnson
during conversations with McPhee began in January of 2005, the earllest date in 2005,
(there is no evidence of this) there is a time gap of at least seventeen (17) months
(August 2003 through January 2005) between the alleged abuse suffered by Johnson
in 2003 and the alleged abuse suffered during conversations with McPhee in 2005
There is a time gap of thirty-six (36) months between the alleged abuse suffered by
Johnson in 2003 and the alleged abuse suffered via the text messaging in October of
2005.
The abuse alleged to have been suffered by Johnson in 2003 occurred within a
six (6) month time period. As set forth above, the minium time gap between the alleged
2003 abuse and the alleged 2005 abuse is seventeen (17) months. Clearly, the six (6)
month period of alleged abuse in 2003 is significantly less than the minimum seventeen
(17) month, and maximum thirty-six (36) month, time gap between the alleged abuse in
2003 and 2005. These facts cannot support a claim that the alleged abuse was
continuing in nature. Therefore, the conduct which allegedly occurred in 2003 should
stand independent of the conduct which allegedly occurred in 2005. As a result,
Johnson would have had to file his claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, which allegedly occurred in the year
2003, by July of 2005 to be within the statute of limitations. The files and records

herein clearly demonstrate that Johnson filed the above entitled matter on December 7,
2005, at least four months after the statute of limitations had run on said claims.
b,

No Facts Supporting Equitable Estoppel

In Winn v. Campbell, Docket No. 34142 (2008), this Court stated:
Equitable estoppel is the sole non-statutory bar to a statute of limitation
defense in ldaho. Ferro v. Society of Saint Pius X, 143 ldaho 538, 540,
149 P.3d 813, 815 (2006). In order to assert equitable estoppel, the
plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) a false representation or
concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of
the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not
discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or concealment was
made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person to
whom the representation was made, or from whom the facts were
concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to
his prejudice. Id. (quofing J.R. Simplot Co. v, Chemefics Inf'l, Inc., 126
ldaho 532, 534, 887 P.3d 1039, 1041 (1994)).All elements of equitable
estoppel are of equal importance, and there can be no estoppel absent
any of the elements. Regjovich v. First Western Inv., Inc., 134 ldaho
154, 158, 997 P.2d 615, 619 (2000) (citation omitted).
In responding to McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment, Johnson made a
cursory argument that McPhee should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of
limitations defense (R. p. 283-285 and 31 1-310). The argument made by Johnson to
the District Court was not supported by facts, which satisfies the elements set forth in
Winn, above

In support of his argument regarding equitable estoppel, Johnson quoted a
portion of his deposition transcript to the District Court (R. p. 284). The quoted portion
of Johnson's deposition transcript refers to the payment of money by an unidentified

person to Johnson, and the statement, "Yeah, we always come through; we'll always
come through for you."
This alleged statement presumably refers to Johnson's claim of Breach of
Contract, not his claims for Negligent and intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
As such, McPhee argues that the alleged statement, even if true, does not have any
effect upon the statute of limitations for Johnson's tort claims. However, with an
abundance of caution, the alleged statement will be addressed herein in the context of
Johnson's tort claims.
Johnson did not provide any facts to the District Court in support of who "we" are
as set forth in the alleged statement. Johnson did not provide any facts to the District
Court providing that McPhee made the alleged statement. The alleged statement does
not allege any tortious conduct on the part of McPhee, or anyone else. In fact, there is
nothing in the record to support a finding that the alleged statement, even if made by
McPhee, would support the statute of limitations for Johnson's tort claims being
equitably estopped.
In addition, Johnson does not allege that the statement was, in fact, false.
Johnson does not allege that if the statement was false, that Johnson could not
discover the truth. If the truth of the alleged statement is that McPhee told Johnson that
he would pay Johnson a real estate commission, such a statement should have
absolutely no effect on the statute of limitations on the tort claims. Johnson does not

allege that the false statement was made with the intent that Johnson rely upon the
same. Lastly, Johnson does not allege, nor has Johnson provided any facts, to support
a conclusion that he relied upon the alleged false statement to his prejudice relative to
his claims of Negligent and lntentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress
Therefore, it was proper for the District Court to dismiss Johnson's claims for
Negligent lnfliction of Emotional Distress and Intentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress
for any alleged conduct which occurred in the year 2003.
2.

Johnson Has Failed to State a Claim for Intentional or
Negligent lnfliction of Emotional Distress

In Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 ldaho 211, 923 P.2d 456 (1996),
the ldaho Supreme Court stated that:
A federal district court case has set forth the framework for the two types
of emotional distress claims-negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Windsor v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 684
F.Supp. 630, 632 (D.ldaho 1988). For a claim of negligent infliction of
emotional distress to arise, there must be physical injury to the plaintiff. Id
at 632 (citing Gill v, Brown, 107 ldaho 1137, 695 P.2d 1276
(Ct.App. 1985).
On the other hand, "[aln action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress will lie only where there is extreme and outrageous conduct
coupled with severe emotional distress." Davis v. Gage, 106 ldaho 735,
741,682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (CtApp.1984), appeal after remand, 109
ldaho 1029, 712 P.2d 730 (Ct.App. 1985).
In Csaplicki v. Gooding Joint School District No. 231, 116 ldaho 326, 775
P.2d 640 (1989) the ldaho Supreme Court stated that:

It is beyond dispute that in ldaho no cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress will arise where there is no physical injury to the
plaintiff. Hathaway v. Krumery, 110 ldaho 515, 716 P.2d 1287 (1986);
Haffield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 ldaho 840,606 P.2d
944 (1980). The "physical injury" requirement is designed to provide some
guarantee of the genuineness of the claim in the face of the danger that
claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined. Haffield, 100 ldaho at
849, 606 P.2d 944.

In Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 ldaho 522, 96 P.3d 623 (2004), this Court
set forth the elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress:
"In Idaho, four elements are necessary to establish a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress: (I)
the conduct must be intentional or
reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must
be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional
distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe." Edmondson V.
Shearer Lumber Products, 139 ldaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740
(2003)(citing Curtis v. Firth, 123 ldaho 598, 601, 850 P.2d 749, 751
(1993)). "Although a plaintiff may in fact have suffered extreme emotional
distress. . . no damages are awarded in the absence of extreme and
outrageous conduct by a defendant." Edmondson, 139 ldaho at 179, 75
P.3d at 740 (quoting Brown v. Fritz, 108 ldaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d
1372, 1376 (1985)). "Courts have required very extreme conduct before
awarding damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress."
Edmondson, 139 ldaho at 180, 75 P.3dat 741. "Even if a defendant's
conduct is unjustifiable, it does not necessarily rise to the level of
'atrocious' and 'beyond all possible bounds of decency' that would cause
an average member of the community to believe it was 'outrageous."' Id.,
(quoting Ford v. Revlon, Inc. 153 Ariz. 38, 43, 734 P.2d 580, 585
(1987)).
In Brown v. Fritz, 108 ldaho 357, 699 P.2d 1371 (1985) this Court held that:
We hold that there is no significant, if in fact any, difference between
conduct by a defendant which may be seen to justify an award of punitive
damages,-and conduct which may justify an award of damages for
emotional distress. Justification for an award of damages for emotional

distress seems to lie not in whether emotional distress was actually
suffered by a plaintiff, but rather in the quantum of outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct. Although a plaintiff may in fact have suffered
extreme emotional distress, accompanied by physical manifestation
thereof, no damages are awarded in the absence of extreme and
outrageous conduct by a defendant. As has been said in Comment (d) to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 46 (1965):

" 'The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good
deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no
occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some
one's feelings are hurt.' "
And, as Judge Magruder has stated:
"Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and
clashings of temperaments incident to participation in a
community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a
better protection than the law could ever be." Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1035 (1936).
In Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products,739 Idaho 772, 75 P.3d 733
(2003), this Court held that:

Summary judgment is proper when the facts allege conduct of the
defendant that could not reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery for intentional or reckless infliction of
emotional distress.
It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the
defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.

If this Court concludes that Johnson's claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress and Intentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress are not time barred under the,
continuing tort theory, it is McPhee's position that the entirety of Johnson's allegations
regarding his claims for Negligent and Intentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
a.

Negligent lnfliction o f Emotional Distress

The District Court stated, "[iln this case, there are some problems with some of
the affidavits that Mr. Johnson has presented in terms of whether or not he actually
suffers post-traumatic stress syndrome, because I think the affidavits are deficient" (Tr.
p. 64, Ln. 18-22). Johnson has provided no evidence that he has suffered any physical
injury as a result of McPhee's alleged conduct. Therefore, Johnson's claim of Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress must fail.
In addition, the elements of a claim for Negligent lnfliction of Emotional Distress
were described by this Court Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,903 P.2d 73 (1995) as:
The elements of common law negligence include (1) a duty, recognized
by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of
conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or
damage.
Johnson has failed to assert the duty which McPhee has allegedly breached,
Johnson has failed to assert that McPhee breached any such duty, and Johnson has
failed to assert a causal relationship between McPhee's alleged conduct and his
damages. The District Court stated, "[tlhere's even some problems whether or not

there's a causal connection between the events that took place between the defendants
and the illness that Mr. Johnson Complains of" (Tr. p. 64, Ln. 22-25; Tr. p. 65, Ln. 1).
Therefore, Johnson's claim for Negligent lnfliction of Emotional Distress must also fail
for these reasons. A further basis for the dismissal of Johnson claim for Negligent
lnfliction of Emotional Distress, is discussed below in the analysis of Johnson's claim
for lntentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress.

b.

lntentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress

Johnson has failed to establish a claim for lntentional lnfliction of Emotional
Distress. The elements of a claim of lntentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress are: (1)
the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and
outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and
the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe.
All of the alleged acts of McPhee, as testified to by Johnson in his depositions,
and as alleged in Johnson's Complaints, do not rise to the level of outrageousness
necessary to sustain a claim of lntentional lnfliction of Emotional Distress.
The essence of the allegations supporting Johnson's claims are that, over the
course of six (6) months in the year 2003, McPhee made crude remarks to Johnson,
some of them sexual in nature, and that in the year 2005, McPhee said things to
Johnson that Johnson did not want to hear.

Balanced against the alleged crude remarks, and the statements Johnson
allegedly did not want to hear, is the fact that Johnson permitted McPhee to.make the
comments, did not ask McPhee to stop making the comments, and did not terminate his
relationship with McPhee (R. p. 192; Tr. p. 83, Ln 5-25; Tr. p. 84, Ln. 1-25; Tr. p. 85, Ln
1-2).
In addition, Johnson testified that he allowed McPhee to make the alleged
statements because McPhee was a friend, that the statements were an expression of
who McPhee was, that Johnson did not want to judge McPhee, and Johnson wanted to
let McPhee be how he is (R. p. 161; Tr. p. 44, Ln 4-15). Johnson also testified that he
did not terminate his relationship with McPhee because there was a long history of a
very good friendship, Johnson had a moral and philosophical position of acceptance,
and Johnson believes it is better for people not to repress themselves (R. p. 161, Tr. p
44, Ln. 4-25; Tr. p. 45, Ln. 1-8).
Furthermore, for a two year period, Johnson made no attempt to inform McPhee
that he did not approve of McPhee's alleged conduct (R. p. 195; Tr. p. 93, Ln 2-25; Tr.
p. 94, Ln. 1-2).
If Johnson's allegations are to be believed, McPhee's conduct could best be
described as "locker room talk." The nature of the alleged behavior is not something
that is so far outside of societal norms that it should be the basis for a lawsuit. From
Johnson's deposition testimony, it appears clear that Johnson did not have an objection

to the "locker room talk," and even if Johnson did have an objection to the "locker room
talk," he did not tell McPhee to stop. Johnson took no affirmative action to protect
himself from the "locker room talk or to mitigate any damages he may have suffered.
In analyzing whether McPhee's alleged conduct was extreme and outrageous,
the Court should consider Johnson's character and prior behavior. Johnson testified
that he was "cocky" and "in your face to society" about having an affair during his
marriage (R. p. 154; Tr. p. 15, Ln. 20-25). That he was "egotistical and in people's face
contrary to societal standard" (R. p. 154; Tr. p. 16, Ln 2-3). That in the year 2002,
Johnson was developing an off color personality (R. p. 154; Tr. p. 14, Ln 19-23). That
while he was a real estate agent, and while he was married, Johnson seduced, and had
sex with, a woman in a vacant house that he had listed for sale (R. p. 156; Tr. p. 22, Ln.
1-15), That Johnson "flipped off" McPhee, pushed McPhee, called McPhee a "puke
and a rapist" and told McPhee that he would "knock his teeth down his throat" (R. p.
198; Tr. p. 106, Ln 5-25; Tr. p. 107, Ln 1-2). In addition, Johnson testified that he had
no moral problem sleeping with five or six women, not his wife, during his marriage (R.
p. 197; Tr. p. 197, Ln. 24-25; Tr. p. 103, Ln. 6-16). Johnson also testified that he lied to
his employer about engaging is sex in the house he had listed (R, p. 155; Tr. p. 19, Ln.
1-25).
Obviously, Johnson's prior behavior reflects a person who has exposed himself
to conduct, and has engaged in conduct, which has, or which should have, hardened

him to the rough edges of society. McPhee's alleged conduct would have, and should
have had, no negative effect on such a hardened individual.
Johnson claims that McPhee's alleged conduct has caused him emotional
distress and associated monetary damages. However, Johnson testified that he was
suffering emotional distress prior to McPhee's alleged conduct and that he had suffered
a reduction in his income as a result of his alleged pre-McPhee emotional distress. As
a result, Johnson has failed to establish a causal connection between McPhee's
alleged conduct and his alleged emotional distress (R. p. 154; Tr. p. 14, Ln. 19- 25; Tr.
p. 15, Ln. 1-25; Tr. p. 16, Ln. 1-70; Tr. p. 17, Ln. 9-25; Tr. p. 18, Ln. 1-25; Tr. p. 19, Ln.
1-25; Tr. p. 20, Ln. 1-6). Johnson also testified that he had been traumatized prior to
being exposed to McPhee's alleged conduct (R. p. 157; Tr. p 27, Ln. 19-25; Tr. p. 28,
Ln. 1-6).
Lastly, as set forth above, it is for the court to determine, in the first instance,
whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and
outrageous as to permit recovery. The Court therefore has the authority, and the
obligation, to determine if the alleged conduct of McPhee could reasonably be regarded
as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Clearly none of McPhee's alleged
conduct does not rise to the level of being so extreme and outrageous to permit
Johnson to recover on his claims.

The District Court correctly recited the legal standard and stated, "[slo, even
assuming that these statements were made, I have to come to the conclusion for the
purposes of summary judgment that these statements were extreme and outrageous.
And, again, the standard is beyond all possible bounds of decency that would cause an
average member of the community to believe it was outrageous" (Tr. p. 65, Ln. 18-24).
The District Court then applied the facts of the case to the legal standard and
stated, "[wjell, certainly, the language that was used was inappropriate. Certainly, the
comments and suggestions that were made to Mr. Johnson would not be the type of
language that one might want to use in the normal course of business dealings or in
everyday, common, decent conversation. But certainly, for this Court to come to the
conclusion that this would support an action for intentional infliction or negligent
infliction of mental distress or emotional distress would leave the Court to pretty much
open the door to any type of locker room comments or vulgar discussions between
people" (Tr. p. 65, Ln. 25; Tr. p. 66, Ln. 1-12).
The District Court went on to state that. "[wlhile it certainly is not pretty language
or comfortable language, I don't think that it rises to the level of outrageousness that the
statute or that the cause of action requires" (Tr. p. 66, Ln. 15-18).
The District Court concluded that, "[slince the Court will be the finder of fact, it
certainly is possible to infer that Mr. McPhee could not reasonably be regarded his
conduct is so extreme and outrageous such as to permit a recovery for emotional

distress. Instead, I think these actions fall within the category of, rough around the
edges, inconsiderate, or hurtful, but certainly not the outrageous conduct that would be
required to support such a cause of action" (Tr. p. 67, Ln. 21-25; Tr. p. 68, Ln. 1-4).
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully requested that the Court affirm
the District Court's dismissal of Johnson's claims of Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
C.

Breach of Contract

Johnson alleges that he is entitled to a commission from McPhee as a result of
the purchase of certain real property for a development known as Radiant Lake Estates
(hereinafter: "Radiant Lake") (R. p. 93). A portion of the Radiant Lake property was
purchased by JCAV from George Thayer (R. p. 218). Another portion of the Radiant
Lake property was purchased by JCAV from Neighborhood, Inc. (R. p. 203). Both
parcels were purchased on or about January, 2005 (R. p. 201). Johnson alleges that at
all times relevant to the purchases of the property for Radiant Lake, he was a licensed
real estate agent (R. p. 93). Johnson alleges that there was an oral contract between
he a d McPhee for the payment of a commission from the purchase of the Radiant
Lake property (R. p. 93)
1.

McPhee was not the Agent of JCAV for the Purchase of the
Radiant Lake Property

Johnson appears to be making an argument that~McPheeallegedly told Johnson
that Johnson would be paid a real estate commission for assisting in the purchase of
the Radiant Lake Property by JCAV, that the Radiant Lake property was purchased by
JCAV, that McPhee is an agent of JCAV and that JCAV and McPhee are liable to
Johnson for the commission
In Hausam v. Schnabl, 126 ldaho 569,887 P.2d 1076 (Ct. App. 1994) the
Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
The existence of an agency relationship is a question for the trier of fact to
resolve from the evidence. Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107
ldaho 406,409, 690 P.2d 341, 344 (1984); see also Bailey v. Ness, 109
ldaho 495,498, 708 P.2d 900,903 (1985); Hilt v. Draper, 122 ldaho
612, 616, 836 P.2d 558, 562 (Ct.App.1992). This Court will not disturb a
district court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a).
The burden of proving the existence or extent of an agency rests on the
party alleging it. Gissel v. State, 111 ldaho 725, 729, 727 P.2d 1153,
1157 (1986); Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. Van's Realty Co., 91
ldaho 510,517,427 P.2d 284,291 (1967). In Bailey v. Ness, 109 ldaho
at 497, 708 P.2dat 902, the ldaho Supreme Court explained the nature of
an agency relationship and how it arises:
The three types of agencies are: express authority, implied
authority, and apparent authority.
Both express and implied authority are forms of actual
authority. Express authority refers to that authority which the
principal has explicitly granted the agent to act in the
principal's name. Implied authority refers to that authority
"which is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or
perform" the express authority delegated to the agent by the
principal.

Apparent authority differs from actual authority. It is created
when the principal "voluntarily places an agent in such a
position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with
the business usages and the nature of a particular business,
is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to
existing authority." [Citations omitted.]
In Hausam, the Court of Appeals went on to state:
As noted earlier, apparent authority exists when the principal voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ord~naryprudence,
conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular
business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to
existing authority. Bailey, 109 ldaho at 497, 708 P.2d at 902. One must
use reasonable diligence to ascertain the agent's authority. ldaho Title
Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 96 ldaho 465, 468, 531 P.2d 227, 230
(1975); Podolan v. ldaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 ldaho 937, 944,
854 P.2d 280, 287 (Cf.App.1993). Reasonable diligence encompasses a
duty to inquire with the principal about the agent's authority. Podolan, 123
ldaho at 944,854 P.2d at 287.
In Hausam, the Court of Appeals also stated:
Moreover, the apparent power of the agent is to be determined by the acts
of the principal, not by the acts of the agent. Brunette v. ldaho Veneer
Co., 86 ldaho 193, 198, 384 P.2d 233, 236 (1963); Hieb v. Minnesota
Farmers Union, 105 ldaho 694, 697, 672 P.2d 572, 575 (Ct.App. 1983).
The declarations of an alleged agent, standing alone, are insufficient to
prove the grant of power exercised by the agent and to bind the principal
to third parties. Clark, 95 ldaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 280; see also Bailey,
109 ldaho at 497-98, 708 P.2d at 902-03; Killinger v. Lest, 91 ldaho
571,575,428 P.2d 490,494 (1967); Brunette, 86 ldaho at 199, 384
P.2d at 236; Hilt, 122 ldaho at 618, 836 P.2d at 564. To establish
apparent authority, the purported principal must do something to lead the
third party to believe that the ostensible agent has authority. Hilt, 122
ldaho at 618, 836 P.2d at 564.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals in Hausam stated:
As this Court has stated, "an agent with actual authority for one purpose
does not thereby become an apparent agent for all other types of
transactions." Hieb, 105 Idaho at 698, 672 P.2daf 576.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that JCAV granted McPhee express
authority to agree to pay Johnson a real estate commission. In fact, the Affidavit of
Jack Vanderwaal states that during the summer of 2004, McPhee approached JCAV
regarding a lake project, and at that time, most of the details in the purchase of the land
had been worked out, and JCAV did not want to partner with McPhee on the project,
but considered doing the entire project alone (R. p. 266). In a subsequent Affidavit of
Jack Vanderwaal, Mr. Vanderwaal states that JCAV has never had any agreements
with McPhee relative to the purchase of the Radiant Lake Property and that McPhee
did not purchase the Radiant Lake Property. The record clearly reflects that JCAV did
not grant McPhee express authority to pay Johnson a real estate commission regarding
the Radiant Lake Property.
Without the express authority from JCAV, McPhee did not have the implied
authority to enter into an agreement on behalf of JCAV to pay Johnson a real estate
commission. Therefore, the only remaining type of agency upon which Johnson can
rely is apparent authority.
Johnson had done business with JCAV prior to JCAV's purchase of the Radiant
Lake Property (R. p. 265). Said business included representing JCAV as a real estate

agent in the purchase and sale of other real property (R. p. 265). Johnson was aware
that Jack Vanderwaal was the only authorized signer for JCAV and that JCAV had in
the past, provided a written approval of McPhee's acts relative to other real property
transactions (R. p. 343). More revealing is the fact that when information needed to be
conveyed and confirmed in another property transaction involving JCAV, which
preceded JCAV's purchase of the Radiant Lake Property, Johnson discussed the
matter directly with Mr. Vanderwaal, not McPhee (R. p. 349). Based upon these facts, it
would have been prudent for Johnson to exercise reasonable diligence and ascertain
whether McPhee had the authority to agree to pay Johnson a real estate commission
relative to the Radiant Lake Property. Johnson failed to exercise such reasonable
diligence. Had Johnson done so, he would have discovered that McPhee was not the
agent of JCAV and that McPhee had no authority to promise to pay Johnson a real
estate commission relative to JCAV's purchase of the Radiant Lake Property.
McPhee and JCAV deny that McPhee was acting as the agent for JCAV when
the alleged agreement was made between McPhee and Johnson to pay Johnson a real
estate commission. Johnson has the burden of proving the existence of such an
agency relationship between McPhee and JCAV relative to the payment of a real estate
commission. Johnson has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that such an
agency relationship did not exist. In addition, ~ohnsonhas not demonstrated that he

exercised reasonable diligence in determining the existence of such an agency
relationship.
This Court should uphold District Court's finding that there was no agency
relationship, and that even if there was an agency relationship, there is nothing in the
record to indicate that JCAV approved or acknowledged McPhee's conduct (Tr. p. 69,
Ln 2-17)
2.

There is no Contract Between Johnson and McPhee

The Radiant Lake property was purchased by JCAV on or before January 5,
2005 (R. p. 201). McPhee is not now, and has never been, a member of JCAV (R. p.
269). At no time has there ever been a written document creating a brokerage agency
relationship between Johnson and JCAV, or between Johnson and McPhee (R. p. 145;
Tr. p. 30, Ln. 1-22). McPhee did not purchase the Radiant Lake property (R. p. 201; R
p. 269).
a.

No Meeting of the Minds

Johnson described the alleged agreement between he and McPhee as follows
(R. p. 166; Tr. p. 61, Ln 11-25; Tr. p. 62, Ln. 1-2):
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And it is your testimony that Mike McPhee

12

said to you, "If Mr. Thayer doesn't pay you the

13

commission, I will pay you the commission"?

A.

Essentially Mike McPhee made a very

encompassing statement that if the land owners don't
pay me, encompassing all land owners and in any
situation, where you are trying to sell as a real
estate agent and you are selling property that is
not listed for sale, that he would pay me.
Q.

So that was -- in your mind that meant

parcels other than the one from George Thayer?

A.

That meant any and all parcels in just a

general good faith, "You are working for me and I am
going to -- you are going to get paid one way or
another."
62
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Q.

But that's not in writing, correct?

2

A.

Correct.

Clearly, based upon Johnson's testimony, there was no meeting of the minds on
the specifics of the terms of the alleged agreement. One essential element that is
missing, and perhaps the most important element from Johnson's perspective, is how
much was Johnson to be paid? Without an agreement on this issue, a legally binding
agreement could not have been formed.

b.

Alleged Agreement Violates the Statute o f Frauds

ldaho Code § 54-2002 states:
No person shall engage in the business or act in the capacity of real
estate broker or real estate salesperson in this state without an active
ldaho real estate license therefore. Unless exempted from this chapter,
any single act described within the definitions of "real estate broker" or
"real estate salesperson" shall be sufficient to constitute "engaging in the
business" within the meaning of this chapter. Any person who engages in
the business or acts in the capacity of real estate broker or salesperson in
this state, with or without an ldaho real estate license, has thereby
submitted to the jurisdiction of the state of ldaho and to the administrative
jurisdiction of the ldaho real estate commission, and shall be subject to all
penalties and remedies available under ldaho law for any violation of this
chapter.
ldaho Code $54-2050 states:
All real estate brokerage representation agreements, whether with a buyer
or seller, must be in writing in the manner required by section 54-2085,
ldaho Code, and must contain the following contract provisions:
(I)
Seller representation agreements. Each seller representation
agreement, whether exclusive or nonexclusive, must contain the following
provisions:
(a) Conspicuous and definite beginning and expiration
dates;
(b) A legally enforceable description of the property;
(c) Price and terms;
(d) All fees or commissions; and
(e) The signature of the owner of the real estate or the
owner's legal, appointed and duly qualified representative,
and the date of such signature.

(2) Buyer representation agreements. Each buyer representation
agreement, whether exclusive or nonexclusive, must contain the following
provisions:

(a) Conspicuous and definite beginning and expiration
dates:
(b) AII financial obligations of the buyer or prospective buyer,
if any, including, but not limited to, fees or commissions;
(c) The manner in which any fee or commission will be paid
to the broker; and
(d) Appropriate signatures and their dates.
(3) Prohibited provisions and exceptions -- Automatic renewal clauses. No
buyer or seller representation agreement shall contain a provision
requiring the party signing the agreement to notify the broker of the party's
intention to cancel the agreement after the definite expiration date, unless
the representation agreement states that it is completely nonexclusive and
it contains no financial obligation, fee or commission due from the party
signing the agreement.

(4) Copies required. A broker or salesperson who obtains a written
brokerage representation agreement of any kind shall, at the time of
securing such agreement, give the person or persons signing such
agreement, a legible, signed, true and correct copy thereof. To the extent
the parties have agreed in writing, copies that are eiectronicaiiy generated
or transmitted, faxed or delivered in another method shall be deemed true
and correct.
(5) Electronically generated agreements. To the extent the parties have
agreed in writing, brokerage representation agreements with a buyer or
seller that are electronicallv aenerated or transmitted. faxed or delivered in
another method shall be dk&ed true and correct and enforceable as
originals.
Idaho Code $54-2084 states:

(1) A buyer or seller is not represented by a brokerage in a regulated real
estate transaction unless the buyer or seller and the brokerage agree, in a
separate written document, to such representation. No type of agency
representation may be assumed by a brokerage, buyer or seller or
created orally or by implication.

(2) Types of brokerage relationships. The following types of brokerage
relationships are recognized:
(a) Nonagency;
(b) Agency representation;
(c) Limited dual agency representation;
(d) Limited dual agency with assigned agents
Johnson alleges that at all times relevant to the purchase of the Radiant Lake
property, he was a licensed real estate agent. This is not correct (R. p. 238).
Johnson alleges that there was an oral agreement that McPhee would pay him a
commission from JCAV's purchase of the Radiant Lake property. The real property
purchased for Radiant Lake was purchased by JCAV, LLC. McPhee has never been a
member of JCAV, LLC. McPhee was not the agent of JCAV relative to the purchase of
the Radiant Lake Property. McPhee did not purchase the Radiant Lake Property.
The ldaho Real Estate License Law requires that all real estate brokerage
representation agreements, whether with a buyer or seller, be in writing. Furthermore,
the ldaho Real Estate License Law provides that a buyer or seller is not represented by
a brokerage in a regulated real estate transaction unless the buyer or seller and the
brokerage agree, in a separate written document, to such representation. Lastly, and
perhaps the most instructive, is the provision of the ldaho Real Estate License Law,
which states that no type of agency representation may be assumed by a brokerage,
buyer or seller or created orally or by implication.

Johnson's claim for a commission based upon an alleged oral agreement must
fail, as a matter of law. Furthermore, Johnson is not entitled to a commission from
McPhee because McPhee did not purchase the Radiant Lake property.
Furthermore, Johnson testified that (R. p. 148; Tr. p. 42, Ln. 7-26; Tr. p. 43, Ln.
1-4):
7

A.

I was directed to find a piece of

8

property and make a deal happen where we would build

9

a lake, by Mike [McPhee].

10

Q.

And when did that happen?

11

A.

Approximately the spring of 2004.

12

Q.

No, when-

13

A.

No, I'm sorry, he told me to find a piece

14

of property, it had to be late 2003 because by

15

spring of 2004 we actually had a piece of property

16

and we actually were negotiating contracts.

17
18

Q.

And was that the piece of property that

was purchased by JCAV?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Do you have a legal on that?

21

A.

I do not.

22

Q.

Do you have a signed earnest money on

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

So you weren't involved with the purchase

23

I

I

I

1

I

2

that?

of that?
A.

That's correct, not in contract, but in

3

spirit and heart, yes, absolutely positively, which

4

is why we are here."

I

Johnson further testified that (R. p. 181; Tr. p. 87, Ln. 2-9):

I

I
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Q.

Did you have a signed listing agreement?

3

A.

No. I -- just a promise -

4

Q.

Did you talk about what the terms were?.

5

A.

There was no written

!
!

i

\

6

i
i

7
8

I
i

9

-- it was just -- it was

a promise that isn't enforceable, and I realize that.
Q.

Okay. So you're not suing for an

unenforceable promise?

A.

No.

By Johnson's own admission, there is no promise to be enforced. Johnson was
i
!
!

I

not a licensed real estate agent at the time of the sale and purchase of the Radiant
-35-

Lake property and is therefore barred, as a matter of law, from receiving a commission
from the sale and purchase of the property
Johnson also argues that the alleged agreement to pay him a real estate
commission was partially performed by McPhee, and the alleged oral agreement is
therefore not subject to ldaho Code § 54-2001, et seq.
In Commercial Ventures, Inc., v. The Rex & Lynn Lea Family Trust, Docket
No. 33139 (2008), this Court stated:

ldaho law provides a statute of frauds for real estate commissions:
No contract for the payment of any sum of money or thing of value, as
and for a commission or reward for the finding or procuring by one person
of a purchaser of real estate of another shall be valid unless the same
shall be in writing, signed by the owner of such real estate, or his legal,
appointed and duly qualified representative. I.C. § 9-508.
Additionally, a brokerage contract requires the signature of both the owner
and the broker, as it is not a unilateral contract the broker can accept by
full performance. C. Forsman Real Est. Co. v. Hatch, 97 ldaho 511, 515,
547 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1976).
The primary purpose of I.C. § 9-508 is to prevent fraudulent or unfounded
claims of brokers. This particular portion of our code relates entirely to
statutes of frauds and has as its objective avoiding disputes as to whether
or not an agreement in fact exists, the amount of a commission and the
exclusive or non-exclusive terms of a listing agreement. Id. at 515, 547
P.2d at 1120.
In Chapin v. Linden, Docket No. 32956 (2007) this Court stated:
The doctrine of part performance works in conjunction with the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. "Under ldaho law, part performance per se does not
remove a contract from the operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, the

doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific form of the
more general principle of equitable estoppel." Lettunich, 141 ldaho at
367,109 P.3d at 1109. (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 ldaho 242,249,93
P.3d492, 499 (2004)). Equitable estoppel generally, and the doctrine of
part performance specifically, assume the existence of a complete
agreement. See Lettunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3dat 1109. Like any
contract for the sale of land, an oral agreement "must be complete,
definite, and certain in all its terms, or contain provisions which are
capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty," before it w~llbe
specifically enforced by operation of the doctrine of part performance.
Lettunich, 141 ldaho at 367, 109 P.3d at 1109 (citing Bear Island
Water Ass'n, Inc., 125 ldaho at 723, 874 P.2d at 534).
The threshold question for this Court, then, is whether there was a
meeting of the minds between the Chapins and the Lindens on the
essential terms of their agreement. For a land sale contract to be
specifically enforced, the contract must typically contain the minimum
provisions of the parties involved, the subject matter thereof, the price or
consideration, a description of the property, and all the essential terms of
the agreement. Hoffman, 102 ldaho at 190, 679 P.2d at 221.
The alleged agreement between McPhee and Johnson for a real estate
commission, is not a land sale contract. However, the requirements of ldaho Code
§ 54-2001, et seq., generally follow the requirement of a land sale contract. Therefore,

the analysis in Chapin can be used in this case relative to partial performance, the
statute of frauds and ldaho Code § 54-2001, et seq.
Furthermore, the well reasoned decision in Commercial Ventures applied to the
facts of this case should result in this Court's affirmation of District Court's dismissal of
Johnson's claim for Breach of Contract

As set forth above, there was no meeting of the minds relative to the alleged real
estate commission agreement. As a result, the alleged terms are not complete and
definite, and the Court cannot require performance of an agreement that has uncertain
terms, especially when the alleged agreement is not in writing as required by law.

3.

Johnson has failed to Provide an Adequate Record on Appeal

As stated above, Johnson failed to include McPhee's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the Appellate Record and failed to include McPhee's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in the Appellate Record.
In Credit Bureau, Inc. of Georgia v. Harrison, 101 Idaho 554, 617 P.2d 858
(1980), this Court stated:

One other issue is raised by the appellant on appeal: that there is no valid
summons in the record and that the return of service not accompanied by
a valid summons fails to furnish sufficient grounds to sustain the action of
the district court. Certainly, I.R.C.P. 4(g)(7) requires that the original
summons shall be attached to any return of service However,
notwithstanding that this issue was not raised at the district court and
appears first on appeal, it is well settled that error will not be presumed,
but must be shown affirmatively by the appellant on the record Dawson
v. Mead, 98 ldaho 1, 557 P.2d 595 (1976); Glenn Dick Equipment Co.
v. Galey Construction, Inc., 97 ldaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975); Close
v. Rensink, 95 ldaho 72, 501 P.2d 1383 (1972). The burden is therefore
upon the appellant to have presented to this Court a record sufficiently
complete to support a specific allegation of error.
I.A.R. 17(h) requires that a notice of appeal contain a designation of
documents to be included in the record in addition to those automatically
included pursuant to I.A.R. 28. Rule 28(a) does not list the summons
under automatic inclusion. The proper way for the appellant to have the
summons included is to request it pursuant to Rule 28(b). Looking to the

I
I

notice of appeal filed in this action, we find that request was made only for
the affidavit of service. The district court clerk's certificate to record listed
only this affidavit, not the summons, and the appellant acknowledged
service of a completed record. The appellant never requested that the
summons be included in the record. She cannot be heard to say now on
appeal that because there is no summons in the record, the return of
service is invalid. The mere absence of the summons in the record,
without a proper request for its inclusion by appellant, is insufficient
ground upon which to base her allegation of error.
Johnson failed to request that McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment and

i
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McPhee's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment be included in the Appellate
Record. Johnson has therefore failed to meet his burden to present a record

1

!

sufficiently complete to support his allegation that the District Court erred in granting
McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court should affirm the District Court's

i

I

decision granting McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that

i

Johnson has failed to provide a complete record on appeal.
I

I

!

2.

McPhee is Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs
McPhee requests that the Court award him the reasonable attorney fees and
costs he has incurred in the above-entitled matter pursuant to Rule 41 of the ldaho
Appellate Rules, ldaho Code fj 12-120(3) and ldaho Code fj 12-121.
McPhee's claim for attorney fees under ldaho Code fj 12-120(3) is based upon
Johnson's claim for Breach of Contract and the description of the alleged agreement

therein fitting the definition of a commercial transaction. As the prevailing party,
McPhee is entitled to such an award.
McPhee's claim for attorney fees under Idaho Code !j 12-121 is based upon the
fact that Johnson's appeal of the District Court's decision dismissing the claims of
Breach of Contract, and Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress was
brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. The law related
to all of Johnson's claims, and the facts of this case, all demonstrate that Johnson's
appeal is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the decision of the District Court
granting McPhee's Motion for Summary Judgment and award McPhee his reasonable
attorney fees and costs incurred herein.
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